In this paper we study the selection principle of closed discrete selection, first researched by Tkachuk in [13] and strengthened by Clontz, Holshouser in [3] , in set-open topologies on the space of continuous real-valued functions. Adapting the techniques involving point-picking games on X and C p (X), the current authors showed similar equivalences in [1] involving the compact subsets of X and C k (X). By pursuing a bitopological setting, we have touched upon a unifying framework which involves three basic techniques: general game duality via reflections (Clontz), general game equivalence via topological connections, and strengthening of strategies (Pawlikowski and Tkachuk). Moreover, we develop a framework which identifies topological notions to match with generalized versions of the point-open game.
Introduction
The closed discrete selection principle was first studied by Tkachuk in 2017. This property occurs naturally in the course of studying functional analysis. Tkachuk connected this selection principle on C p (X) with topological properties of X. He then went on to consider the corresponding selection game, creating a partial characterization of winning strategies in that game and finding connections between it, the point-open game on X, and Gruenhage's W -game on C p (X) [14] . In 2019, Clontz and Holshouser [3] finished this characterization, showing that the discrete selection game on C p (X) is equivalent to a modification of the point-open game on X. Clontz and Holshouser show this not only for full information strategies but also for limited information strategies.
The current authors continued this work, researching the closed discrete game on C k (X), the real-valued continuous functions with the compact open topology [1] . They show that similar connections exist in this setting, with the point-open game on X replaced by the compact-open game. They also isolated general techniques which have use beyond the study of closed discrete selections.
In this paper, we study the problem of closed discrete selection in the general setting of setopen topologies on the space of continuous functions. We use closed discrete selection as a tool not only for comparing X to its space of continuous functions, but also for comparing different set-open topologies to each other. To establish these connections, we prove general statements in three categories:
1. strengthening the strategies in games, 2. criteria for games to be dual, 3 . characterizations of strong strategies in abstract point-open games, and use work of Clontz [2] to show that some general classes of games are equivalent.
• U is an ω-cover of X provided that given any finite subset F of X, there exists some U ∈ U so that F ⊆ U ,
• U is said to be a γ-cover if U is an infinite ω-cover and for every finite subset F ⊆ X, {U ∈ U : F ⊆ U } is finite,
• U is a k-cover of X provided that given any compact subset K of X, there exists some U ∈ U so that K ⊆ U , and
• U is said to be a γ k -cover if U is an infinite k-cover and for every compact K ⊆ X, {U ∈ U : K ⊆ U } is finite.
Note that if U = {U n : n ∈ ω}, then U is a γ k -cover if and only if every cofinal sequence of the U n form an k-cover. For a family of sets A, let
to be all open covers U so that X ∈ U and for every A ∈ A, there is an open set U ∈ U which contains A,
• Λ(X, A) be all open covers U so that X ∈ U , and for all A ∈ A, there are infinitely many U ∈ U so that A ⊆ U , and
• Γ(X, A) to be all infinite open covers U so that X ∈ U and for every A ∈ A, {U ∈ U : A ⊆ U } is finite.
Remark 1. Note that
• O(X, [X] <ω ) = Ω X denotes the collection of all ω-covers of X.
• O(X, K(X)) = K X denotes the collection of all k-covers of X.
• Γ(X, K(X)) = Γ k (X) denotes the collection of all γ k -covers of X.
Notation. We let
• For any collection A, ¬A is the complement of A.
• T X denote the set of all non-empty subsets of X.
• Ω X,x denote the set of all A ⊆ X with x ∈ cl X (A). We also call A ∈ Ω X,x a blade of x.
• Γ X,x denote the set of all sequences {x n : n ∈ ω} ⊆ X with x n → x.
• D X denote the collection of all dense subsets of X.
• CD X denote the collection of all closed and discrete subsets of X.
• O X denote the collection of all open covers of X.
• Λ X denote the collection of all λ-covers of X.
• Γ X denote the collection of all γ-covers of X.
We can create variations of selection principles and their negations by looking at selection games. Definition 8. Given a set A and another set B, we define the finite selection game G α fin (A, B) for A and B as follows:
Definition 9. Similarly, we define the single selection game G α 1 (A, B) as follows:
where each A ξ ∈ A and x ξ ∈ A ξ . We declare Two the winner if {x ξ : ξ ∈ α} ∈ B. Otherwise, One wins. We let
Definition 10. We define strategies of various strength below.
• A strategy for player One in G α
If player One has a winning strategy, we write I ↑ G α 1 (A, B).
• A strategy for player Two in G α
If player Two has a winning strategy, we write II ↑ G α 1 (A, B).
• A predetermined strategy for One is a strategy which only considers the current turn number. We call this kind of strategy predetermined because One is not reacting to Two's moves, they are just running through a pre-planned script. Formally it is a function σ : α → A. If One has a winning predetermined strategy, we write I ↑ pre G α 1 (A, B).
• A Markov strategy for Two is a strategy which only considers the most recent move of player One and the current turn number. Formally it is a function τ : A × α → A. If Two has a winning Markov strategy, we write II ↑ mark G α 1 (A, B).
Definition 11. Two games G 1 and G 2 are said to be strategically dual provided that the following two hold:
Two games G 1 and G 2 are said to be Markov dual provided that the following two hold:
Two games G 1 and G 2 are said to be dual provided that they are both strategically dual and Markov dual. Generally, when N [A] is being used in a game, we will use the identification of A with N (A) to simplify notation. Particularly, One picks A ∈ A and Two's response will be an open set U so that A ⊆ U .
Definition 12.
A topological space X is called discretely selective if, for any sequence {U n : n ∈ ω} of non-empty open sets, there exists a closed discrete set {x n : n ∈ ω} ⊆ X so that x n ∈ U n for each n ∈ ω; i.e. S 1 (T X , CD X ) holds. This notion was first isolated by Tkachuk in [13] .
Definition 13. For a topological space X, the closed discrete selection game on X, is G 1 (T X , CD X ). Tkachuk studies this game in [14] .
Note that X is discretely selective if and only if I ↑ pre G 1 (T X , CD X ).
Remark 5. For a topological space X and x ∈ X, Gruenhage's W -game for X at x is G 1 (N (x), ¬Γ X,x ) and Gruenhage's clustering game for X at x is G 1 (N (x), ¬Ω X,x ). if there is a map ϕ : A → C so that whenever F ⊆ A is cofinal relative to B, then ϕ[F] is cofinal relative to D. This definition is inspired by Paul Gartside's work on the Tukey order [5] .
Suppose (P, ) is a partially ordered set. We define on P × ω by (p, n) (q, m) ⇐⇒ (p q and n m).
Lemma 1. For any partially ordered set (P, ) and any Q ⊆ P , (Q × ω, P × ω) T (Q, P ).
Proof. Let φ : P × ω → P be defined by φ(p, n) = p. Suppose A ⊆ P × ω is cofinal for Q × ω and let q ∈ Q be arbitrary. By the cofinality of A, we can find (r, m) ∈ A so that (q, 0) (r, m). It follows that q r = φ(r, m) which demonstrates that φ[A] is cofinal for Q. Proof. Let ϕ : A → C be so that whenever F ⊆ A is cofinal for B, then ϕ[F] is cofinal for D. Also let F = {A α : α < κ} ⊆ A be cofinal for B. Then ϕ[F] is a subset of C and is cofinal for D. Thus cof(C; D, * ) κ.
Suppose towards a contradiction that cof(C; D, * ) = λ < κ. Then we can find a collection G = {C α : α < λ} ⊆ C which is cofinal for D. Now let ψ : C → A witness that (C; D, * ) T (A; B, ). Then ψ[G] ⊆ A and is cofinal for B. But this would imply that cof(A; B, ) < κ, a contradiction.
By the cofinality of F relative to B × ω, we can find A ∈ A and m ∈ ω so that B ⊆ A and n m.
That is, ψ[F] is cofinal in N C B (X) (0). Without loss of generality, suppose A =Ā. To address
Suppose toward contradiction that B ⊆ A U . Then, for x ∈ B \ A U , we can find a continuous function f :
Were n > n U , consider the constant function defined by f (x) = 2 −n . This is a contradiction to
3 Strengthening Strategies
Inductively continue in this way.
Definition 16. For collections A and B, recall that A refines B, denoted A ≺ B, provided that, for every B ∈ B, there exists A ∈ A so that A ⊆ B.
In [9] , Pawlikowski showed that
The authors generalized this in a previous paper. The following lemmas are slightly more general than proved there, but the proofs are the same as in [1] . In [12] , Tkachuk showed that I ↑ G 1 ([X] <ω , ¬O X ) if and only if I ↑ G 1 ([X] <ω , ¬Γ X ). The authors generalized this result to O(X, A) in [1] , assuming that A is an ideal. Here we show that one only needs to assume that A is an ideal base.
Lemma 9. For any strategy σ for One in G 1 (A, B) where A and B are collections, define
If σ is a winning strategy, then for any x n : n ∈ ω ∈ play ω σ , {x n : n ∈ ω} ∈ B.
. , x n ). We claim that x n+1 ∈ A n+1 . To see this, we know that x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n+1 ∈ play σ so x n+1 ∈ σ( x j : j < n + 1 ) = A n+1 . Hence, the x n arise from a single run of the game according to σ.
Since σ is winning for One, {x n : n ∈ ω} ∈ B.
Proposition 10. Let A and B be collections. Set
Proof. Let s be a winning strategy for One in G 1 (A, ¬B). For x 0 , · · · , x n ∈ play s , define γ(x 0 , · · · , x n ) ∈ A to be so that
s(x 0 , · · · , x j ). Now we will define a winning strategy σ for One in
, and so on. Suppose also that σ has been defined in such a way that for a fixed x n ∈ σ(x 0 , · · · , x n−1 ),
We check that this definition satisfies the two properties relative to n + 1. Fix
The second property holds by the definition of σ. This completes the definition of σ.
We now show that σ is a winning strategy. Suppose A 0 , x 0 , A 1 , x 1 , · · · is a full run of the game G 1 (A, ¬B Γ ) played according to σ. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there is an infinite
Then by the construction of σ, x 0 , · · · , x jn ∈ play s for all n ∈ ω. Hence, {x jn : n ∈ ω} ∈ play ω s , and so by the Lemma 9, {x jn : n ∈ ω} = B ′ ∈ B, a contradiction. Thus {x n :∈ ω} ∈ B Γ , and σ is a winning strategy.
The other direction of the proof is obvious.
Corollary 11. Let A be an ideal-base. Then One has winning (pre-determined) strategy for the game G 1 (N [A] , ¬O(X, B)) if and only if One has winning (pre-determined) strategy for G 1 (N [A] , ¬Γ(X, B)). The same is true for pre-determined strategies.
Proof. Notice that if A is an ideal base, then N [A] is a filter base. Also notice that O(X, B) Γ is the same thing as Γ(X, B). This shows that
The fact that the results hold for pre-determined strategies follows from a modification of the proof of the proposition. Simply set
and check that this works.
An Order on Single Selection Games
Definition 17. Let A, B, C, and D be collections and α be an ordinal. Say that G α
.
, then the games are equivalent. Also notice that II is transitive. 
Proof. Suppose II ↑ mark G α 1 (A, C) and let τ be a winning Markov strategy for Two. We define a winning Markov strategy for Two in G α 1 (B, D). Toward this end, let {B ξ : ξ ∈ α} ⊆ B be arbitrary and set
Suppose II ↑ G α 1 (A, C) and let τ be a winning strategy for Two. We define a strategy t for
For β ∈ α, suppose we have {A ξ : ξ < β}, {B ξ : ξ < β}, {x ξ : ξ < β}, and {y ξ : ξ < β} defined.
This concludes the definition of t. By (Tr1), since x ξ ∈ ← − T I,ξ (B ξ ), it follows that y ξ ∈ B ξ . Using (Tr2), we see that
Suppose I ↑ G α 1 (B, D) and let σ witness this. We will develop a strategy s for One in G α 1 (A, B) . 
After the run of the game is completed, let x ξ+1 ∈ s(x 0 , · · · , x ξ ) for all ξ ∈ α and x 0 ∈ s(∅). Then (Tr1) gives us that
As σ is a winning strategy for One in I ↑ G α  1 (B, D) ,
We will show that {A ξ : ξ ∈ α} forms a winning strategy for One in
In some situations, the use of both maps is not necessary as the translation between player One's moves simply comes from lifting the translation of player Two's selections. 
Equivalent and Dual Classes of Games
Corollary 14. Let X be a Tychonoff space and A, B ⊆ ℘(X). Then
, Ω C B (X),0 ), and (iii) if A consists of closed sets and X is A-normal, then
Thus if A consists of closed sets and X is A-normal, then the three games are equivalent.
Next, suppose {φ(f n , n) : n ∈ ω} ∈ Λ(X, B). Let B ∈ B and ε > 0 be arbitrary. Then, there is n ∈ ω large enough so that B ⊆ f −1 n [(−2 −n , 2 −n )] and 2 −n < ε. It follows that f ∈ [0; B, ε]. By Corollary 13, this completes (i).
Next we check that
, Ω C B (X),0 ). As D C A (X) ⊆ Ω C A (X),0 , this is true. Simply have Two use the exact same counter-play or strategy.
For (iii), define
First check that the functions are well-defined. To see that We need to see that { − → T II,n (f n , U n ) : n ∈ ω} ∈ Λ(X, B). Notice − → T II,n (f n , U n ) = U n ∈ U n with the property that f n [X U n ] = 1. Let B ∈ B. Then there is an n 0 so that 1) ], and so B ∩ (X \ U n 0 ) = ∅. Therefore B ⊆ U n 0 . There is an n 1 > n 0 so that f n 1 ∈ [0; B, 1] {f k : k n 0 } and so B ⊆ U n 1 . Continuing this process inductively, we see that B is covered infinitely many times and that {U n : n ∈ ω} ∈ Λ(X, B).
Corollary 15. Let X be a Tychonoff space and A, B ⊆ ℘(X). Then
(iv) If A consists of closed sets, X is A-normal, and B consists of R-bounded sets, then G 1 (N [A] , ¬Λ(X, B)) II G 1 (T C A (X) , CD C B (X) ).
Thus if A consists of closed sets, X is A-normal, and B consists of R-bounded sets, then all these games are equivalent.
Proof. First we check that G 1 (N C A(X) (0), ¬Ω C B(X) ,0 ) II G 1 (N [A] , ¬Λ(X, B)). Define
The maps are well-defined since the continuous pre-image of an open set is open.
We check (Tr1). Suppose f ∈ ← − T I,n (N (A)). We need to check that
We check (Tr2). Suppose f n ∈ ← − T I,n (N (A n )) and that {f n : n ∈ ω} / ∈ Ω C B(X) ,0 . Then f n ∈ [0; A n , 2 −n ] and there is a B ∈ B, an ε > 0, and an N ∈ ω so that for all n N , f n / ∈ [0; B, ε]. We need to show that {f −1 n [(−2 −n , 2 −n )] : n ∈ ω} / ∈ Λ(X, B). We proceed by way of contradiction. Suppose in particular that there is a n N so that 2 −n < ε and
. This is a contradiction.
Then
, observe that if Two can create a closed discrete set in response to player One, then Two has avoided having 0 as a cluster point.
Suppose X is A-normal and B consists of R-bounded sets. For U ∈ T C A (X) , V ∈ N (A U ), and n ∈ ω, identify a function f U,V,n : X → R with the property that f U,V,n ↾ A U = f U and f U,V,n [X V ] = {n}. Such a function exists for the following reason. Since X is A-normal, there is a function g so that g[A U ] = 0 and g[X V ] = 1. Let f U,V,n = f U · (1 − g) + n · g and notice that f U,V,n is as required. Define
We check (Tr1). Suppose V ∈ ← − T I,n (U ) = N (A U ). We need to check that
We check (Tr2). Suppose V n ∈ ← − T I,n (U n ) = N (A n ), where A n = A Un and {V n : n ∈ ω} / ∈ Λ (X, B) . Then there is a B ∈ B and N so that for all n N , B ⊆ V n . Say − → T II,n (V n , U n ) = g n and that f Un = f n . Then g n ↾ An = f n and g n [X V n ] = {n}. We proceed by way of contradiction. Let f ∈ C B (X) be so that for all n, there is a k max{N, n} so that g k ∈ [f ; B, 2 −n ]. Since B ⊆ V k , there is an x k ∈ B V k . Thus |g k (x n )− f (x n )| 2 −n , and so f (x n ) k − 1. Proceeding in this way, we can produce an unbounded sequence k n and a collection of points x n ∈ B so that f (x n ) k n −1. But then f is a continuous function where f [B] is unbounded. So B is not R-bounded, which is a contradiction.
Corollary 16. Let X be a Tychonoff space and A, B ⊆ ℘(X). Then
Proof. Part (i) of this corollary is essentially the same as (i) of Corollary 15.
To see that (O(X, A) , B) and G 1 (N [A] , ¬B) are dual.
Proposition 19. Suppose X is a topological space, x ∈ X, and B ⊆ ℘(X). Then G 1 (Ω X,x , B) and G 1 (N (x) , ¬B) are dual.
Proof. It suffices to show that
and is a selection basis for Ω X,x . Clearly, each ran(C) ∈ Ω X,x . Now let F ∈ Ω X,x . Then for each U ∈ N (x), there is an
Corollary 20. G 1 (Ω C A (X),0 , Ω C B (X),0 ) and G 1 (N C A (X) (0), ¬Ω C B (X),0 ) are dual.
, Ω C B (X),0 ) and G 1 (T C A (X) , ¬Ω C B (X),0 ) are dual. Therefore whenever II ↑ G 1 (T C A (X) , CD C B (X) ), we have that I ↑ G 1 (D C A (X) , Ω C B (X),0 ). This is also true for going from Markov strategies to pre-determined strategies.
Proof. We can use reflection to show that G 1 (D C A (X) , Ω C B (X),0 ) and G 1 (T C A (X) , ¬Ω C B (X),0 ) are dual and that G 1 (D C A (X) , ¬CD C B (X) ) and G 1 (T C A (X) , CD C B (X) ) are dual as well. First check that
and is a selection basis for D C A (X) . Clearly, each ran(C) ∈ D C A (X) . Now let D ∈ D C A (X) . Then for
Thus G 1 (D C A (X) , C) and G 1 (T C A (X) , ¬C) are dual for any C ⊆ ℘(C B (X)). Therefore,
, Ω C B (X),0 ).
The analogous results hold for Markov and pre-determined strategies.
Covering Properties
Lemma 22. Suppose X is a Tychonoff space. Then the following are equivalent:
Proof. Clearly, (i) implies (ii). , the f n fail to accumulate to 0 in C B (X). This is a contradiction. So (ii) implies (iii). Now let U n be a sequence of C A (X) neighborhoods of 0 which is cofinal in the C B (X) neighborhoods. We can assume without loss of generality that the U n are descending. Define a strategy σ for player One in G 1 (N C A (X) (0), ¬Γ C B (X),0 ) by σ(n) = U n . Suppose that f n ∈ U n for all n. Let [0; B, ε] be an arbitrary C B (X)-nhood of 0. Then there is an N so that for all n N , U n ⊆ [0; B, ε]. Thus for all n N , f n ∈ [0; B, ε]. So f n → 0 in C B (X). Therefore (iii) implies (i).
The following generalizes V.416 from [12, p. 460] . Moreover, if we replace A with the space of singletons X, we obtain Theorem 1 of Gerlits and Nagy, [6] . Proof. Suppose I ↑ pre G 1 (N [A] , ¬O(X, B)). Let σ be an example of a pre-determined strategy for One in this game. Say ran(σ) = {N (A n ) : n ∈ ω}. We claim that {A n : n ∈ ω} is cofinal for B. Towards a contradiction suppose that there were an B ∈ B so that B ⊆ A n for all n. Then for each n, we can choose x n ∈ B \ A n . Then the sequence N (A 0 ), X \ {x 0 }, · · · would be a play of G 1 (N [A] , ¬O(X, B)). Since σ is winning, B ⊆ X \ {x n } for some n. But then x n ∈ X \ {x n }, a contradiction. Therefore {A n : n ∈ ω} is cofinal for B and cof(A; B, ⊆) ω.
Suppose cof(A; B, ⊆) = ω. Let {A n : n ∈ ω} witness this. Define a strategy σ by σ(n) = N (A n ). Now suppose σ(0), U 0 , · · · is a play of G 1 (N [A] , ¬O(X, B)) according to σ. Let B ∈ B. Then there is an n so that B ⊆ A n ⊆ U n . Thus {U n : n ∈ ω} ∈ O(X, B) and σ is winning.
The following generalizes a result of Telgársky [11] and extends Theorem 27 of [1] .
Lemma 24. Assume A, B ⊆ ℘(X), and A is a collection of G δ sets. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) I ↑ G 1 (N [A] , ¬O(X, B)) Proof. Let σ be a strategy for One. Without loss of generality, One is playing sets from A and Two plays open sets which contain One's play. For every A ∈ A, let U A be a countable collection of open sets so that A = U A .
Define a tree in the following way. Let T 0 = ∅. For n ∈ ω, we define
Observe that each T n is countable as each U A is countable. Hence,
Recursively, this defines a run of the game A 0 , U 0 , A 1 , U 1 , . . . according to σ. So we can conclude that {U n : n ∈ ω} ∈ O(X, B). Thus, B ⊆ U n for some n ∈ ω but then x n ∈ U n , a contradiction. Therefore, cof(A; B, ⊆) ω.
The rest of the equivalence is clear.
Note 1. Let X be the one-point Lindelöfication of ω 1 and consider G 1 (N [[X] <ω ], ¬O(X, [X] <ω )). In X, {ω 1 } is closed, but not a G δ . One has a winning strategy in
Let M be the meager subsets of R. Then player One has a winning tactic (in two moves) for G 1 (N [M] , ¬O X ), but cof(M; X, ⊆) = cov(M) > ω.
The Main Theorems
Theorem 25. Suppose X is a Tychonoff space and A, B ⊆ ℘(X). Suppose A and B are idealbases and that A consists of closed sets. Then the following diagrams are true, where dashed arrows require the assumption that X is A-normal and dotted lines require the assumption that B consists of R-bounded sets.
If X is A-normal, B consists of R-bounded sets, and A consists of G δ sets, then all of the statements across both diagrams are equivalent.
Proof. Since we have assumed that A and B are ideal-bases, Lemma 11 implies that all three versions of the generalized point-open game are equivalent for player One. This applies for full strategies and pre-determined strategies.
The fact that I ↑ G 1 (N [A] , ¬Ψ(X, B)) is equivalent to II ↑ G 1 (O(X, A), Ψ(X, B)) (where Ψ is O, Λ, or Γ) comes from the general reflection result from Clontz, Theorem 17. This also implies the analogous statements for pre-determined and Markov strategies. Since all of the versions of the generalized point-open game are equivalent for player One, we can conclude that all of the versions of the generalized Rothberger game are equivalent for player Two.
By Corollary 20, II ↑ G 1 (Ω C A (X),0 , Ω C B (X),0 ) if and only if I ↑ G 1 (N C A (X) (0), ¬Ω C B (X),0 ), and also at the level of Markov/pre-determined strategies. Likewise, Proposition 21 implies that
, ¬Ω C B (X),0 ), and also at the level of Markov/pre-determined strategies.
Corollary 14 yields the implications between G 1 (O(X, A) , Λ(X, B)), G 1 (Ω C A (X),0 , Ω C B (X),0 ), and G 1 (D C A (X) , Ω C B (X),0 ). Then Corollaries 15 and 16 provide the arrows between games for the rest of the left side of the diagram.
We now check the improved implications in the second diagram. By Lemma 23, we have that I ↑ 
. This suffices to improve the arrows from the first diagram and finishes the second diagram.
Theorem 26. Suppose X is a Tychonoff space and A, B ⊆ ℘(X). Suppose A and B are idealbases and that A consists of closed sets. Then the following diagrams are true, where dashed arrows require the assumption that X is A-normal and dotted lines require the assumption that X is A-normal and B consists of R-bounded sets.
If X is A-normal, B consists of R-bounded sets, and A ≺ B, then all of the statements across both diagrams are equivalent. 
Proposition 21 adds the implications from the statement II ↑ mark
, Ω C B (X),0 ) and then to II ↑ mark G 1 (T C A (X) , ¬Ω C B (X),0 ).
With these connections, the main block of the diagram becomes equivalent without any extra assumptions needed.
If A ≺ B, Lemma 8 applies and all of the statements across the two diagrams are equivalent.
Define a strategy for One in G 1 (O(X, A), O(X, B)) as follows:
In the n th inning, for any countable set A ⊆ R, choose U A,n to be an open set so that A ⊆ U A,n and U A,n has Lebesgue measure < 2 −n . Then σ(n) = {U A,n : A ∈ A}. This is a pre-determined winning strategy for One. Consider a strategy for Two in G 1 (D C A (X) , Ω C B (X),0 ) defined as follows: In the n th inning, One's play must have non-trivial intersection with [0; Q, 2 −n ]. Let Two choose f n in this intersection. Then as in the previous example, f n → 0. This shows that if A does not consist of closed sets, then the properties do not have to be equivalent. Note 3. If we do not require that A be an ideal base, then the statements • II ↑ G 1 (N [A] , ¬Γ(X, B)),
• I ↑ G 1 (O(X, A) , Γ(X, B)), and
are all strictly weaker than any of those present in the first diagram of the previous theorem. This is also true for Markov/pre-determined strategies. The counter example of X = Z with A and B both set to be the singleton subsets of Z demonstrates this.
Assuming that A is an ideal base makes the situation more complicated. In that situation I ↑ G 1 (N [A] , ¬O(X, B)) implies that I ↑ G 1 (N [A] , ¬Γ(X, B)). So to find a space X where II ↑ G 1 (N [A] , ¬O(X, B)) and II ↑ G 1 (N [A] , ¬Γ(X, B)), we need for G 1 (N [A] , ¬O(X, B)) to be undetermined and X to not be a γ-set. These are necessary but not sufficient conditions. We do not currently know of any counter-examples, but we also do not know a good reason why the games should be equivalent for player Two.
Applications
Corollaries 27 and 28 are direct applications of Lemma 24.
Corollary 27. Suppose X is a space where all closed sets are G δ sets, A consists of the closed nowhere dense sets, and B is the set of all singleton subsets of X. Then One has a winning strategy in G 1 (N [A] , ¬O(X, B)) if and only if X is meager.
Corollary 28. Suppose X is a space, A consists of the G δ µ-null sets with respect to a Borel measure µ, and B is the set of all singleton subsets of X. Then One has a winning strategy in G 1 (N [A] , ¬O(X, B)) if and only if X is µ-null; i.e., µ is the trivial zero measure.
The following summarizes a majority of the results from [3] .
Theorem 29. Suppose X is a Tychonoff space. Then (i) G 1 (N [[X] <ω ], ¬Ω X ), G 1 (N Cp(X) (0), ¬Ω Cp(X),0 ), and G 1 (T Cp(X) , CD Cp(X) ) are equivalent, (ii) G 1 (Ω X , Ω X ), G 1 (Ω Cp(X),0 , Ω Cp(X),0 ), and G 1 (D Cp(X) , Ω Cp(X),0 ) are equivalent, (iii) The two groups of games in (i) and (ii) are dual to each other, (iv) I ↑ pre G 1 (T Cp(X) , CD Cp(X) ) iff X is countable iff C p (X) is first countable, (v) For player One, the games G 1 (N [[X] <ω ], ¬Γ X ) and G 1 (N Cp(X) (0), ¬Γ Cp(X),0 ) are equivalent to G 1 (N [[X] <ω ], ¬Ω X ) and G 1 (N Cp(X) (0), ¬Ω Cp(X),0 ), (vi) For player Two, G 1 (Ω X , Ω X ) and G 1 (Ω X , Γ X ) are equivalent, (vii) I ↑ pre G 1 (Ω X , Ω X ) if and only if I ↑ G 1 (Ω X , Ω X ).
The following summarizes a majority of the results from [1] .
Theorem 30. Suppose X is a Tychonoff space. Then (i) G 1 (N [K(X)], ¬K X ), G 1 (N C k (X) (0), ¬Ω C k (X),0 ), and G 1 (T C k (X) , CD C k (X) ) are equivalent, (ii) G 1 (K X , K X ), G 1 (Ω C k (X),0 , Ω C k (X),0 ), and G 1 (D C k (X) , Ω C k (X),0 ) are equivalent, (iii) The two groups of games in (i) and (ii) are dual to each other, (iv) I ↑ pre G 1 (T C k (X) , CD C k (X) ) iff X is hemicompact iff C k (X) is first-countable,
(v) For player One, G 1 (N [K(X)], ¬Γ k (X)) and G 1 (N C k (X) (0), ¬Γ C k (X),0 ) are equivalent to G 1 (N [K(X)], ¬K X ) and G 1 (N C k (X) (0), ¬Ω C k (X),0 ), (vi) For player Two, G 1 (K X , K X ) and G 1 (K X , Γ k (X)) are equivalent, (vii) I ↑ pre G 1 (K X , K X ) if and only if I ↑ G 1 (K X , K X ).
Notice that the property of being σ-compact lies in between being countable and being hemicompact. If we use the fact that Theorems 25 and 26 apply to pairs A and B, then we can generate a setup which characterizes σ-compactness in way that is similar to Theorems 29 and 30.
Theorem 31. Suppose X is a Tychonoff space. Then (i) G 1 (N [K(X)], ¬Ω X ), G 1 (N C k (X) (0), ¬Ω Cp(X),0 ), and G 1 (T C k (X) , CD Cp(X) ) are equivalent, (ii) G 1 (K X , Ω X ), G 1 (Ω C k (X),0 , Ω Cp(X),0 ), and G 1 (D C k (X) , Ω Cp(X),0 ) are equivalent, (iii) The two groups of games in (i) and (ii) are dual to each other, (iv) I ↑ pre G 1 (T C k (X) , CD Cp(X) ) iff X is σ-compact iff cof(N C k (X) (0); N Cp(X) (0), ⊇) = ω,
(v) For player One, the games G 1 (N [K(X)], ¬Γ X ) and G 1 (N C k (X) (0), ¬Γ Cp(X),0 ) are equivalent to G 1 (N [K(X)], ¬Ω X ) and G 1 (N C k (X) (0), ¬Ω Cp(X),0 ), and (vi) For player Two, G 1 (K X , Ω X ) and G 1 (K X , Γ X ) are equivalent.
Open Questions
• Is there a topological characterization of the statement cof(A; B, ) T ω ω ?
• Does I ↑ G 1 (K X , Ω X ) imply I ↑ pre G 1 (K X , Ω X )?
• More broadly, to what extent can the Pawlikowski generalization presented here be further generalized?
• If A is an ideal base, are G 1 (N [A] , ¬Γ(X, B)) and G 1 (N [A] , ¬O(X, B)) equivalent for player Two?
• Can the assumption that B consists of R-bounded sets be removed from Theorems 25 and 26?
• To what extent can the techniques in this paper be used to study more complex selection principles like the Hurewicz property or the α-Fréchet properties?
